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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Policymakers from the G-20 nations and their market-based critics are sometimes missing the 
point about "exit strategies." The G-20 is right to announce that there should be no premature 
exits from macroeconomic stimulus and to reassure that monetary tightening will be technically 
manageable. Yet it is overlooking the more complex challenges that economic policy must 
confront as a result of the emergency measures undertaken since mid-2007 (Eichengreen 2009, 
Posen 2009a). However, this report concludes that international policy coordination of monetary 
and fiscal exit might be desirable but is unfortunately not attainable.  
Some claim that the exit strategy needs a wider remit and greater international coordination. 
There are three dimensions to what potentially has to be done - monetary, fiscal, and financial. 
That is: monetary ease must return to normal interest rate policy (the main focus of this report), 
discretionary fiscal stimulus must shift to putting government budgets on a sustainable path and 
banks' guarantees and state-ownership stakes must be withdrawn (Borio and Disyatat 2009, 
Posen 2009a). 
First, there is a challenge of sequencing, given the interaction among exit measures. Should 
fiscal or monetary tightening come first? Would withdrawal of current extraordinary liquidity 
and deposit guarantees accelerate or offset monetary tightening? Here, some already offer some 
guidance based on past experience. Credible commitments to medium-term fiscal consolidation 
should theoretically precede monetary tightening to pre-empt so-called “Volcker-Reagan policy 
mismatches” which tend to drive up interest rates (Posen 2009a).  
Second, in principle there is a pressing need for international coordination of macro policies 
exits. Most governments and central banks will probably find their exit from the financial crisis 
in a timely and consistent way. But there is one specific co-ordination failure that is both 
extremely destructive but highly probable: a disconnected monetary and fiscal response between 
the US and Europe (Cottarelli and Viñals 2009, Munchau 2009). 
 
Unorthodox monetary policy in the euro area - What has been done so far? 
The ECB has lowered interest rates, reflecting rapid and deep cuts between the autumn of 2008 
and the spring of 2009, and has implemented five "non-standard" unorthodox monetary policy 
(UMP) measures to enhance credit support, taking into account the major role played by banks 
in funding the euro area economy (Borio and Disyatat 2009):  
 
1.  Full accommodation of banks' liquidity needs at fixed rates by switching the refi 
operations to fixed rate tender with full allotments (i.e., unlimited liquidity). 
2.  Expansion of the list of assets eligible as collateral by extending the collateral pool down 
to BBB-. 
3.  Lengthening of the maturities of the refinancing operations and offering supplementary 
long-term refi operations (LTROs) at 3-, 6- and 12-month maturities. 
4.  Providing liquidity in foreign currencies, notably the US dollar and sometimes the CHF, 
to address the need of euro area banks to fund their dollar assets.  
5.  Launching of a direct covered bonds purchase programme to support financial markets. 
Purchasing covered bonds.   These non-standard measures, referred to by the ECB as enhanced credit support, have been 
intended to boost liquidity in the financial system and support credit flows to the non-financial 
sector over and above the interest rate reductions. In other words: in addition to the interest rate 
decision, a range of unconventional measures will need to be unwound.   In the following 
sections, we look at the exit from these measures.  The interest rate issue has been recently 
discussed elsewhere (see, for example, Bartsch 2009a). Most of these studies concluded that the 
ECB will likely keep rates steady until mid-2010.  Some unconventional measures might be 
unwound earlier than that; others will likely remain in place for longer.  
 
2.  MONETARY EXIT STRATEGIES 
Monetary policy has brought interest rates down to nearly zero for all major currencies, 
including the euro. In addition, central-bank efforts to rescue financial systems by giving banks 
easier access to central bank money has caused a rapid and significant expansion, and changes 
in the composition, of banks’ balance sheets. So far, this policy of ‘quantitative easing’ and 
‘qualitative easing’ has not affected the broad money supply and therefore not resulted in 
inflationary pressures ((Borio and Disyatat 2009, von Hagen 2009). But, as banking systems 
recover and inflation expectations increase according to ever rising gold prices etc., central 
banks must keep a keen eye on monetary developments to ensure that inflationary potential does 
not build up in the future (ECB Observer, various issues, von Hagen 2009, von Hagen, Pisani-
Ferry and von Weizsäcker 2009). 
Why exit? If one takes into account that, at least in the long run, all inflation is a monetary 
phenomenon, the question of the exit strategy takes center stage. There is a need for an exit 
strategy to avoid inflation (Buiter 2009a, Cottarelli and Viñals 2009, González-Páramo 2009). 
Current policies, which have expanded the monetary base, are considered potentially 
inflationary, with the inflation risk arising from three sources: activity overstimulated by hyper-
accommodative monetary policy, excess liquidity in the banking system, and the potential 
deanchoring of inflation expectations (linked to the excess liquidity mentioned above). It is clear 
that any large-scale quantitative easing has to be reversed when the economy recovers and the 
demand for base money returns to levels that are not boosted by the extreme liquidity preference 
of a panic-stricken banking system. The central banks must withdraw in a timely manner the 
monetary stimulus injected into the system (Baudchon 2009, Borio and Disyatat 2009, Cottarelli 
and Viñals 2009).  
Indeed, should a significant improvement in the outlook for economic activity not be 
accompanied by an adequate adjustment in the policy stance and a reversal of quantitative 
easing, the current monetary stance may become excessively accommodative as soon as the 
income velocity of money is increasing again in the wake of less uncertainty, thereby giving rise 
to risks to price stability (Belke 2009). If the reversibility, when needed, is not credible, longer-
term inflationary expectations will rise and these inflation expectations, as well as possible 
inflation risk premia, can raise longer-term nominal and real interest rates. But because the 
stimulus was injected to a large degree using unconventional means, there are fears the central 
banks lack the tools needed to undo their previous actions, at least in a timely manner (Buiter 
2009a, González-Páramo 2009). Rising inflation expectations are currently mirrored by ever 
rising gold prices. Last Wednesday the gold price reached its all-time high of 1146 dollar per 
ounce. Moreover, also the US core inflation rate last month increased from 1.5 to a year-on-year 
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value of 1.7 pc at the end-of-year 2009. Note that the Fed has no explicit inflation target but has 
clarified on several occasions that a core inflation rate of 1.5 to 1.7 pc is considered to be ideal. 
Inflation in the euro area can also not be excluded in the medium run. 
Moreover, the long-term success of non-conventional policies depends on the policy-maker’s 
ability to pull off a difficult balancing act: to provide massive stimulus to the economy in the 
short-term, while keeping long-term private sector inflation expectations firmly anchored. The 
failure to preserve the anchoring of long-term inflation expectations would be, expressed in 
game-theoretic terms, self-defeating for non-conventional policies. In such a case, the beneficial 
effects on the economy of the latter policies could be neutralised by an array of adverse factors, 
including increased inflation risk premia, interest rate volatility and Ricardian effects on 
consumer spending (Cottarelli and Viñals 2009, González-Páramo 2009).  
These risks and the innovative nature of the policies mean that central banks will have to make 
an extra effort in communications. Communicating about the exit strategy must be an integral 
part of the exit strategy. Monetary policy transparency and intelligibility are fundamental to the 
credibility of policy objectives. And central bank credibility is of the essence in anchoring 
expectations (regarding inflation or rates). An exit strategy that is clearly identified and 
understood strengthens monetary policy effectiveness because it reassures that inflation and the 
entire yield curve will remain under control once growth resumes (Baudchon 2009 and ECB 
Observer, various issues). 
 
2.1  The need for an exit strategy 
The fact that ECB officials are discussing exit strategies by no means implies that the ECB is 
about to implement them. But for them to be effective, the ECB needs to be transparent. 
Otherwise, investors may become fearful of inflation and concerned about the sustainability of 
public finances. This would no doubt push up long-term interest rates. For the same reasons, 
households might expect higher taxes in the future and raise the share of their income that they 
would rather save than spend. All these effects would, of course, jeopardise the gradual recovery 
and undermine the effectiveness of the policy stimulus (Stark 2009).  
Recently, some central banks, including the Fed and the ECB, have been communicating about 
the exit strategies from their unconventional programs. It is clear that the articulation of an exit 
strategy has been forced up on central banks by market participants. The reason is uncertainty 
regarding the effects of unconventional policy on the economy. Faced with uncertainty, market 
participants naturally look for guidance about the future path of monetary policy. The concern is 
driven mainly by uncertainty about future inflation. Such a concern is not unreasonable, given 
the massive interventions by monetary authorities that led to a sharp rise in their balance sheets 
(Tesfaselassie 2009).  
Consider for example the excess reserves of about $800 billion that banks have with the Fed, 
compared with the typical pre-crisis level of only $10 billion. Whether the inflationary 
consequences of excess reserves is real or perceived, it should be a matter of great concern to 
central banks, as inflation expectations could be embedded in long run inflation, making it 
harder for monetary policy to achieve price stability. Rising inflation expectations are the last 
thing a credible central banker would like to see. Thus, even if central banks do not have to start 
exiting from their unconventional interventions soon, it is important to respond to public 
concerns by coming up with a credible exit strategy. Exit strategy must be understood as 
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it is about being clear about the end game once the economic environment returns to normal. 
One must see the strategy as specifying the tools that central banks may use when it is time to 
tighten monetary policy (Tesfaselassie 2009).  
But there is more than inflation fears without monetary exit. The experience of the past decade 
has led many economists to conclude that protracted accommodative monetary conditions, 
especially when they become widespread at the global level, may make access to credit in 
international financial systems too easy. Easy credit availability can in turn depress interest rates 
across the maturity spectrum and lead to severely distorted financial asset prices as agents 
engage in increasingly speculative behaviour. Thus, preventing the monetary policy stance from 
becoming excessively accommodative is important not only to directly preserve price stability, 
but also to avoid the emergence of financial imbalances that may – if they prevail for too long – 
eventually give rise to episodes of macroeconomic instability.  
 
Whither goest thou? - Where to go? 
While there is no doubt that the return to normality of our economies will need to be 
accompanied by a normalisation of monetary conditions, the key question is what we mean by 
“normal” in the post-crisis environment. Indeed, there is significant empirical evidence showing 
that financial crises tend to have large and long-standing costs in terms of output and 
employment and tend to be followed by persistent declines in asset prices (Reinhart and Rogoff 
2009). In the specific case of the current crisis, there are increasing concerns that its cost in 
terms of lost financial, physical and human capital all over the world may prove very 
substantial. As a result, the crisis may end up having a protracted impact on the rate of potential 
growth of a number of economies, including the euro area (González-Páramo 2009).  
Therefore, in the post-crisis world, we may operate in an environment in which the dynamic 
properties of our economies are persistently affected, so that returning to “normality”, as we 
knew it before, will take a long time. As a side effect, the statistical regularities underlying the 
estimates of models and indicators (e.g. the output gap and the interest rate gap) often used for 
policy analysis may not be as stable as in the past (Belke 2009). The ECB has traditionally been 
reluctant to rely exclusively on models and summary indicators of the monetary policy stance, 
so it is usually not concerned about the reliability of any specific indicator. Yet, it shares the 
more general concern that in the future decisions will be taken in an environment characterised 
by high uncertainty and reduced reliability of the monetary policy maker’s conventional 
information set (González-Páramo 2009).  
Faced with increased uncertainty, central banks are at their best when they clearly commit to a 
well-defined goal and pursue it consistently and independently. The ECB strategy includes a 
specific quantitative definition of price stability: annual inflation of below, but close to, 2% in 
the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices over the medium term. This definition sets a clear 
benchmark against which decisions must be made (ECB Observer, various issues).  
Thus, in a period of increased uncertainty it is crucial for the ECB to set its interest rate 
instrument at any point in time at the level which is appropriate to ensure the achievement of its 
primary objective. The assessment of the risks to medium-term price stability based on a 
comprehensive and robust set of indicators will prove essential in guiding monetary policy 
decisions in the future. In this respect, the ECB’s choice of a full-information approach resting 
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on  two complementary pillars (an economic analysis and a monetary analysis), with its 
advantages in terms of robustness is likely to prove very beneficial in providing insurance 
against increased model and paradigm uncertainty (ECB Observer, various issues, González-
Páramo 2009).  
In fact, the ECB is walking “a tightrope in reining in excess liquidity and in removing monetary 
policy stimulus” (Bartsch 2009). Remember that the last ECB tightening cycle in 2005 initially 
led to an outcry amongst European politicians and international organizations claiming – at that 
time - that the ECB's move was premature.  Yet, the ECB strictly followed its broad-based 
analysis of the outlook for price stability and their cross-checking against monetary 
developments which indicated the need to tighten.  With the benefit of hindsight, it can be stated 
that the ECB was correct (ECB Observer, various issues from 2005 on).  Today, however, 
macroeconomic uncertainty, financial market dislocations and foreign exchange repercussions 
render the exit an even more finely calibrated decision. History shows that even small monetary 
policy decisions can have a big market impact. Bartsch (2009), for instance, refers to the fall of 
1987, when a small 10bp hike in the Bundesbank's repo rate caused a transatlantic policy spat. 
The latter caused markets to doubt the political commitment to the Louvre Accord which aimed 
to stabilise the USD. Concerns about support for the USD sent the US equity market which 
already was wobbly in the wake of a hike in capital gains taxes into a tailspin (Bartsch 
2009). Parallels with today’s situation are striking. 
Turning now to the monetary policy implementation framework, one should recall that prior to 
the escalation of the financial crisis in September 2008, the operational framework worked quite 
well. Hereafter, many exceptional measures were taken to support the availability of liquidity 
and the recovery of the euro area economy. Looking ahead, as conditions in the financial 
markets normalise further, not all these liquidity measures will be needed to the same extent as 
during the crisis. Therefore, one should envisage a situation in which the main operational 
features that were in place prior to the crisis are restored, while of course also bearing in mind 
the lessons learned from the crisis (Cottarelli and Viñals 2009, González-Páramo 2009). 
In particular, the ECB seeks to revert to a situation in which the one-week main refinancing 
operation (MRO) is the main tool for steering money market rates and in which the ECB acts as 
“rate-taker” in the longer-term money market (Stark 2009). In addition, under normal 
circumstances, central banks also do not provide liquidity in foreign currency. Finally, the use of 
using self-originated paper as central bank collateral should be considered as an anomaly under 
normal market conditions (González-Páramo 2009). 
 
 
2.2  (How) Should the ECB further reduce the volume of money (money 
supply) and roll back credit easing in order to prevent inflation?  
At last year's “The ECB and its Watchers Conference” (2009) and on several other occasions at 
that time, ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet and ECB Executive Board Member Juergen Stark 
outlined how the ECB might approach the different dimensions of its policy exit. Essentially, 
they conveyed the clear impression that the ECB’s interest rate decision will be based merely 
on the bank's assessment of the risks to price stability. Meanwhile, decisions on enhanced credit 
support will be taken with a view to financial stability and market functioning. Analytically, it 
clearly makes sense to separate  these two issues and to fight one goal with only one 
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stressing that price stability takes precedence in all decisions. Should non-standard measures 
pose a threat to price stability, they will be unwound "promptly and unequivocally" according to 
its statute. As long as they do not, however, they can be unwound gradually as markets continue 
to normalise. But if market dislocations continued to impair the transmission mechanism, these 
measures could also well be left in place for longer. According to different issues of our ECB 
Observer report (see http://www.ecb-observer.com) this should serve as a clear and satisfying 
assignment. 
Of course, due to uncertain time lags in the effects of monetary policy, the timing of any 
intervention to exit is very crucial but hard to know in advance because the intervention will 
represent a turning point in the monetary policy stance. Already any signal given by central 
banks about the timing of an exit strategy would increase yields on long-term bonds via the term 
structure. The fear is that such a preannouncement could drive up interest rates prematurely, 
derailing the by now significant but still fragile recovery (Tesfaselassie 2009). Moreover, it has 
some implications for the sustainability of fiscal policy and for the coordination of monetary and 
fiscal exit (see section 3.2).  
 
General sequencing of measures 
If one wants to derive some general principles of sequencing of monetary exit steps, Bini 
Smaghi (2009) is very instructive and well-taken as a starting point. Hence, this section outlines 
his principles of sequential and conditional monetary exits in the necessary detail.  
Starting with the problem of the adequate sequence of exit events, it should be taken into 
account that any reversal of an environment of extremely low interest rates and ample liquidity 
which aimed at favouring borrowers and penalising lenders changes the incentive structure over 
the medium term. On the other hand, most of the unconventional measures put in place are 
designed to stimulate lending, to convince savers to hold risky longer-term assets. The 
effectiveness of these measures therefore mainly depends on the readiness of banks to go back 
to their main business of lending to households and firms rather than parking excess reserves 
with the central bank. 
Clearly, an increase in policy rates – and in particular in the deposit rate – risks undermining 
banks’ incentive to re-engage in funding the private sector. In a similar vein, prospects of rising 
interest rates may discourage private savers from purchasing longer-term assets, as a tightening 
of monetary policy inevitably implies a capital loss for those who bought these assets. Raising 
policy rates or the expectation of such increases, when confidence is not fully restored could 
therefore be counterproductive (Bini Smaghi 2009).  
What, then, are the implications for the sequencing of unwinding conventional and 
unconventional policy measures? In simple terms, it means that non-standard measures that aim 
mainly at restoring the orderly functioning of money markets, such as supplementary longer-
term refinancing operations or an extended menu of eligible collaterals, might have to be rolled 
back before interest rates are increased again. Why?  
First of all, because raising interest rates in an environment in which such unconventional 
measures were still judged to be necessary would risk undermining a sustained recovery by 
money markets. If concerns about the required and available amounts of short-term funding still 
prevailed among market participants, raising rates might reinforce these fears and could lead to 
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further, unwarranted upward pressure on overnight rates (Bini Smaghi 2009).  
Second, supplying extra liquidity to the markets through non-standard measures while, at the 
same time, tightening monetary policy would send mixed signals on the effective monetary 
policy stance. Measures to alleviate the strains in money markets could in fact be seen as a 
continued easing of the monetary policy stance (Bini Smaghi 2009).  
Third, with non-standard measures such as the unlimited provision of liquidity still in place it 
might be more difficult for the central bank to steer the level of market rates consistent with its 
policy target. For example, a fixed rate tender with full allotment usually leaves the banking 
sector with a large daily liquidity surplus, which needs to be mopped up by additional fine-
tuning operations towards the end of the reserve maintenance period in order to avoid a sharp 
drop in the overnight interest rate. This, however, causes extra volatility in the markets as well 
as large interest rate fluctuations that are undesirable from the point of view of an effective 
signalling of the monetary policy stance (Bini Smaghi 2009).  
Fourth, with markets still in need of additional non-standard measures, the pass-through of an 
increase in policy rates would probably be hampered. The orderly transmission of any monetary 
tightening would only resume once trust among market participants has had been restored and 
money markets were operating normally again (Bini Smaghi 2009).  
Finally, in any bank-dominated system of fund intermediation in which the recovery of the 
economy largely depends on the soundness of the banking system, inflationary pressures that 
would require a tightening of monetary policy are likely to appear only when the banks take up 
their normal lending activity again. This, in turn, implies that non-standard measures should 
ideally be rolled back before interest rates will be increased (Bini Smaghi 2009).  
This reasoning might not hold for measures taken to revitalise the flow of credit in certain 
market segments – such as through the purchase of corporate bonds. These measures are 
primarily designed to bypass the financial sector and to ensure that non-financial corporations 
still have access to external financing. Now, in theory, by stimulating longer-term investments 
and hence aggregate demand, these measures might induce inflationary pressures in the medium 
to long-term, independent of the functioning of money markets and lending by banks.  
The strength of this channel depends on the depth of the corporate bond market. If policy-
makers were to react to these inflationary pressures by raising interest rates pre-emptively while 
money markets were still weak, the consequences for the banking channel of intermediation 
could be severe – for the reasons just given. If, however, markets were to function properly 
again, there would be no reason to postpone the unwinding of ‘credit easing’ policies to a date 
longer than needed. Taken together, this reasoning suggests that purchases of privately issued 
securities should be unwound before or at the same time as interest rates are raised back to 
normal levels (Bini Smaghi 2009). 
It is important to note that most of the ECB's non-standard measures have a sell-by date at 
which the liquidity will be withdrawn again, unless the bank decides to prolong the programme 
(Bartsch 2009).  According to Juergen Stark (2009) and, more recently, also Jose Manuel 
González-Páramo (2009), the ECB aims to re-establish a situation where the one-week MRO is 
the main tool for steering money market rates and where the ECB acts as a ‘rate-taker' in the 
term-funding money again. The latter would imply switching back to partial allotment or even 
variable rate tenders.  
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phasing out the respective operations should be the ECB’s assessment of the financial situation 
and, specifically, how funding risk evolves, without compromising its price stability mandate. 
The latter implies that the criterion for how and when to withdraw the monetary policy stimulus 
in terms of the key ECB interest rates must be a thorough assessment of risks to price stability. 
Based on its economic and monetary analyses, the ECB should continue to monitor very closely 
all developments over the period ahead. It should ensure that the measures taken are unwound in 
a timely fashion and the liquidity provided is absorbed in order to counter effectively any threat 
to price stability (Stark 2009 and various issues of the ECB Observer, http://www.ecb-
observer.com). Two different scenarios should be considered in this context.  
The first scenario is one where the problems in the money markets disappear before any upside 
risks to price stability emerge. In this case, unconventional measures should be unwound before 
policy rates are raised. The withdrawal would likely impact money market rates, many of which 
are below the refi rate at the moment.  
The second scenario is one where upside risks to price stability emerge while the problems in 
the money market persist and bank funding is still constrained. This could happen if inflation 
expectations became unhooked, for instance. In this case, the ECB should keep enhanced credit 
support in place, i.e. should maintain the structure and size of its balance sheet and raise its 
policy rates. Supplying unlimited liquidity to the banking system would likely leave money 
market rates below the refi rate. In this context, the key question is whether the funding 
constraints result from dysfunctional markets overall or from specific situations at individual 
institutions.  If the issue was intrinsic to individual institutions, targeted measures outside 
monetary policy - such as government guarantees, recapitalisations or asset swaps - would seem 
more appropriate (Bartsch 2009).  
 
Detailed sequencing of measures 
With regard to the sequencing of the withdrawal of non-standard liquidity measures, there is 
less flexibility and more path-dependence than one might think and it is useful to distinguish 
again between the main different types of measures (Borio and Disyatat 2009, González-Páramo 
2009).  
 
1.  For non-standard refinancing operations such as the full accommodation of banks' 
liquidity needs at fixed rates, there is an obvious built-in mechanism that facilitates their 
removal, as the operations mature at pre-specified dates and can then be replaced by 
conventional refinancing operations, if needed.  
2.  Extending the collateral pool down to BBB-. It has been made clear that the widening of 
the collateral framework is temporary. More precisely, its remaining into effect is linked 
to the conduct of 12-month LTRO in December 2009. Hence, the widening of the 
collateral framework will be naturally phased out in December 2010, unless otherwise 
decided.  
3.  Lengthening of the maturities of the refinancing operations. Offering supplementary 
LTROs at 3-, 6- and 12-month maturities. Exit by naturally phasing out. 
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4.  The provision of foreign currency liquidity does not need to be renewed when it is 
considered that it is no longer warranted. However, it would push the dollar even further 
down vis-à-vis the euro with the well-known side-effects for the euro area This might 
represent a positive side effect in times in which international investors distrust the euro 
area in the wake of the Greek insolvency crisis and the inability of the euro area to cope 
with it (Belke, Goecke and Guenther 2009). In this context, the exit from this specific 
measure has already started: owing to lack of demand, the ECB has already discontinued 
foreign currency-providing operations with longer maturities.  
5.  Launching of a direct covered bonds purchase programme to support financial markets. 
There is no particular need to dispose of the purchased bonds at any future moment in 
time, as it does not interfere with monetary policy implementation. The ECB could 
therefore decide to hold the portfolio until maturity and let it gradually shrink over time 
as a result of redemptions. Alternatively, the portfolio could be disposed of in a gradual 
way that would make it possible to avoid market distortions. In any case, the alternative 
options can be considered again once the entire portfolio of exit measures has been 
established. Currently standing at around EUR22 billion, the purchase programme is 
slightly ahead of schedule.   It is expected to be completed by June 2010, when the 
ceiling of EUR60 billion should be reached. The programme could possibly be extended, 
but given its success in bringing covered bond spreads down that might not be necessary 
(Bartsch 2009). 
 
Seen on the whole, thus there are no technical obstacles to the implementation of the ECB’s 
envisaged exit strategy. Unlike many other central banks, for instance, the Riksbank has not at 
all purchased securities and this will make the phase-out even more uncomplicated than for the 
ECB. In any case, the ECB has the instruments to allow her to actively withdraw liquidity. 
Longer-term liquidity-absorbing operations could be envisaged in a scenario where it is clear 
that the need to absorb persists for a certain period of time, and where a significant tightening in 
monetary policy is needed. In this case, long-term liquidity absorption could be used to quickly 
restore a deficit situation along with an increase in interest rates. It may be recalled that many 
central banks worldwide constantly and successfully implement monetary policy through 
liquidity-absorbing operations (González-Páramo 2009).  
 
Some reflections on specific details 
As stated above, the stance of monetary policy, as reflected in short-term interbank interest 
rates, can obviously be tightened through an increase in key policy rates, or through a tighter 
liquidity supply, or through a combination of both. It is too early at present to say which 
approach, or combination of approaches, should be followed, as it will depend on the 
circumstances prevailing at the relevant moment in time (González-Páramo 2009).  
The interest rate decision is more straightforward than the non-conventional measures. For the 
ECB to be willing to raise interest rates, the Council will have to be reasonably confident that 
the recovery is sustainable. The focus will likely be on the domestic demand recovery, notably 
corporate investment and consumer spending. A turnaround in the labour market is probably not 
a necessary precondition though. As in December 2005, it should preferably rather be again the 
monetary analysis that will swing the decision towards a tightening. The base case should be 
that the ECB will start to raise the refi rate around mid-year. The risk is that the bank decides to 
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we think: looming credit constraints and rising inflation expectations. The euro is a factor too, 
but like asset markets, probably less important unless it starts to swing wildly (Belke 2009a). In 
any case, the pace of interest rate increases should be gradual.  It will probably take until 2013 
before euro area short rates will get close a neutral level (Bartsch 2009). 
Ahead of raising the refi rate itself, the ECB could ideally nudge money market rates 
higher. With the EONIA overnight rate at 35bp in December 2009, there is some scope for 
‘stealth' tightening by the ECB. Even though the ECB currently seems content with EONIA 
being close to the deposit rate, according to ECB President Trichet in one of his recent 
November 2009 press briefings, they might want to bring market rates closer to the refi rate 
before actually hiking it. The convergence between market interest rates and the refi rate can be 
brought about in several ways, according to a couple of market analysts. The prevailing market 
view is exemplified in the following by the propositions of Bartsch (2009) which appear to be 
overall logically consistent (see also, for instance, Baudchon 2009). 
First, the ECB could simply bring the deposit rate closer to the refi rate, probably as part of a 
decision to narrow the corridor defined by the deposit rate and the marginal lending facility. The 
advantage of this approach is it is simple and it directly affects interest rates.  By paying higher 
rates on deposits, the ECB would incentivise banks to hold liquidity buffers.  At the same time, 
liquidity hoarders would have less incentive to offer funds in the interbank market.  
Second, an indirect approach to nudge market interest rates closer to the key ECB policy rate is 
to drain liquidity from the money market by conducting reverse refi operations in which the 
ECB offers to take back excess funds at an interest rate that is somewhere above the deposit rate 
but still below the refi rate.  The ECB regularly engages in such reverse refi operations 
already.  But, typically these are quick tenders with a one-day maturity at the end of the 
maintenance period when the market tends to be awash with cash after minimum reserve 
requirements have been met.  The advantage of reverse refi operations is that they offer 
operational flexibility. The disadvantage is that relying on them might require rather frequent 
market intervention. 
The third option is to drain liquidity by issuing so-called ECB debt certificates. By issuing such 
certificates, which can have a maturity of up to one year, the ECB would enter new territory (see 
section 1.5 for details). 
The fourth option is to switch the operational procedure for some or even all of the tenders 
away from fixed rate with full allotment.  A first step would be to switch back to partial 
allotments. This system, which was in place between January 1999 and June 2000, allows the 
ECB to fully control the actual refi rate paid by banks and the amount of liquidity added to 
system.  If the bids exceed the liquidity offered by the ECB, the allocation will be pro-rata. In 
this case banks would be forced to raise additional funds in the interbank market.  The main 
drawback of partial allotment is that banks tend to overbid massively. A more radical step would 
be to go back to the variable rate tenders that were in operation until October 2008, which by 
definition only offer partial allotment.  In contrast to the fixed rate tenders, however, banks will 
also need to submit an interest rate bid. 
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The bottom line - A final roadmap for the ECB's policy exit 
Some operational decisions depend on information that only the ECB has access to. Others are 
dependent of market developments. With these caveats in mind, we believed and were proven to 
be correct ex post the sequencing of the ECB's policy exit next year could look like this. First, 
reduce liquidity offered in ultra-long refi tenders (e.g., one-year and increasingly also six-month 
tenders). Second, wean banks of the full allotment liquidity drip by switching back to partial 
allotment and possibly to variable rate tenders for some LTROs. Third, bring EONIA closer to 
refi rate via reverse refis and/or issuing certificates. Fourth, start to hike interest rates gradually 
since deflation fears gradually disappear also in the US and instead medium-term inflation fears 
emerge. Fifth, switch MRO tenders away from full allotment. In terms of the timeline, we would 
expect the active management of money market rates back towards the refi rate to start in the 
spring, in time for a first rate hike around mid-year (Bartsch 2009, Baudchon 2009). 
To foster a common understanding about their exit strategies, central banks need to explain what 
available tools they have − both conventional as well as unconventional − and how they intend 
to use them. First and foremost, it should be made clear that when the recovery is solid, financial 
markets are back to normal and credit risk spreads narrow to a comfortable level and the risk to 
inflation over the medium term rises, then central banks will start tightening monetary policy. In 
this case there are no economic constraints in adopting the main tool of conventional monetary 
policy  − open market operations − to push the official target for interest rates (and thus 
borrowing costs) up. Central banks can engage in outright sales of (or reverse repurchase 
agreements on) government bonds, the most liquid and safe financial assets. In principle, open 
market operations can be augmented by a new tool − raising the interest rate on banks’ reserves 
at the central bank. The benefit of this action would be to make sure that any excess liquidity in 
the banking system is stashed back at the central bank, thereby preventing excess credit creation 
and ultimately inflation. In any case, rising interest rates (official and market rates) will be part 
of any balance sheet reduction by central banks and raising the reserve rate will have effects 
beyond banks reserves. This point seems to be ignored in some policy discussions (Baudchon 
2009, Hall and Woodward 2009, Tesfaselassie 2009). 
In some sense, calls for an exit strategy are reminiscent of the debate on whether central banks 
should announce projections of future interest rate (Goodhart 2009). Under normal conditions, 
central bank decisions are based on output gap and inflation projections. Policy stance is 
captured by the so-called Taylor rule, which proposes how interest rates should respond to 
inflation and output gap.  
The main objection against publishing interest rate projections of central banks comes from the 
complexity of decision making by committees. Almost all central banks have committees that 
make monetary policy decisions. Naturally, there is more disagreement among members 
regarding the future state of inflation and output gap than the current levels. It is not difficult to 
imagine that the current extraordinary conditions imposed by the financial crisis mean that 
besides output gap and inflation, assessing normality of financial markets in the future will also 
play a key role in monetary policy. This creates more challenges for central bank committee 
members to agree on the future state of the economy and the appropriate course of action. It 
could, therefore, be counterproductive to dwell into specifics of the exit strategy, in particular 
the timing of future interventions to be taken by central banks regarding their unconventional 
policy.  The focus should be on remaining alert to the risks posed by inflation and taking 
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programs (Baudchon 2009, Tesfaselassie 2009). 
 
 
2.3  Should the exits be one-off or step-by-step? 
 
When to exit from current policies? The principle of timeliness 
When  to begin tightening, and where to begin (with conventional and/or nonconventional 
measures) is a far more challenging question than how. If you want greater precision than “as 
early as possible”, one should not put a date but talk about the conditions that need to be in 
place to trigger an exit. What follows is not a specific recommended sequence of dates but 
seeks rather to set out the terms of the debate and review the various exit conditions. In this 
section, we feel legitimized to follow the proposals by Baudchon (2009) which serve best to 
underline the necessity of timeliness of the monetary exit measures. 
Because the nonstandard credit easing policies were implemented only after standard monetary 
easing was close to reaching its limits, the natural order of events would be to completely end 
the nonstandard policies before moving back up the chain and hiking rates. Credit easing came 
in as a replacement for rate cuts; so undoing the credit easing could be a substitute for raising 
rates (Baudchon 2009). 
This is the natural sequence, but it could be disrupted; the high level of excess reserves does not 
prevent “conventional” monetary tightening. Balance sheets don’t have to contract to pre-crisis 
levels before the first rate hikes occur (especially because the contraction process will take 
time). Still, rate hikes would be hard to justify unless accompanied by a significant reduction in 
excess reserves. There is an obvious reason for this. In the US, for instance, many of the credit 
easing measures are based on the conviction that market conditions are “unusual and exigent”; 
this judgment is implicit in maintaining the measures in place, and is fundamentally inconsistent 
with circumstances warranting an increase in the Fed funds rate (Baudchon 2009).  
The first step towards monetary tightening is simply putting an end to monetary policy easing. 
Next, as in any monetary policy cycle, comes the twofold question of the best time to begin the 
tightening cycle, and the speed at which it should be conducted. Today, the issue is steering 
between tightening too early or too fast (undermining the fragile bases of the recovery), and 
tightening too late (because of the need to contain inflation). The task facing the central banks 
will be easier if the recovery is strong and robust, and harder if it is soft and fragile (Baudchon 
2009).  
How monetary and financial conditions will be impacted by an active withdrawal of liquidity is 
more uncertain than in the case of an ordinary increase in rates. An asymmetric response by 
markets cannot be ruled out, as markets could tighten to a greater degree than they eased. Hence 
the importance of communicating about what is being done to minimize the market “noise” 
surrounding the decision (see introduction). Beginning by draining liquidity could nonetheless 
buy the time required to test the robustness of the recovery and its capacity to withstand less 
accommodative monetary policy, while tempering inflation fears. This form of tightening is 
expected to occur gradually (Baudchon 2009).  
Raising interest rates is where the question of speed really comes into play. Central banks have 
to choose among four possible strategies: gradual tightening, either early or late; or aggressive 
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tightening, either early or late. If we follow Mishkin’s arguments, an aggressive approach goes 
without saying (Mishkin 2009). That would be a logical symmetric response to a particularly 
aggressive but necessary action to tackle the financial crisis and the risk of a deflation spiral. 
Theoretically, for a central bank whose main objective is price stability, and which is as 
concerned by inflation as by deflation, monetary policy should be symmetric when rates rise and 
fall. But actual practice differs, as central banks are more aggressive in cutting rates than in 
raising them (Belke and Rees 2009).  
According to Trichet (2009), the preparations for exit are important. The Governing Council 
has to ensure that the measures taken are quickly unwound, and the liquidity provided is 
absorbed, once the macroeconomic environment improves. Long-term refinancing operations 
(like operations with shorter maturity) provide liquidity over a fixed time horizon and run off in 
a fully predictable way. By contrast, the unwinding of outright purchases as implied for exit by 
the US-Fed typically requires an additional decision, namely whether to hold the securities to 
maturity – and if not, when to sell. The route taken by the Eurosystem avoids such decisions, 
since it - except the covered bonds programme - relies largely on built-in mechanisms for the 
reabsorption of liquidity (Trichet 2009).  
 
At what speed? The principle of gradualism 
How quickly should policy-makers reverse their policies? On the one hand, withdrawing 
liquidity in such large quantities will trigger a substantial contractionary monetary policy shock. 
The large size of many easing programmes will make it difficult to sell assets without a 
significant market impact. If it happens too quickly or abruptly, policy-makers risk choking off 
the economic recovery or imposing heavy capital losses on lenders. For instance, in the 
corporate bond or commercial paper market, even small sales of securities by the central bank 
could cause spreads to widen considerably and to sharply tighten credit conditions for firms 
(Bini Smaghi 2009).  
On the other hand, with policy rates at record low levels and additional liquidity-providing 
measures adopted in so many countries, the possibility of inflation risks emerging sometime 
later is not something that can be excluded. Retaining such exceptional policy measures for too 
long might aggravate the upside risks to price stability and sow the seeds for future imbalances 
in financial markets (Belke and Rees 2009, Bini Smaghi 2009).  
Getting the timing right in withdrawing additional liquidity is likely to be decisive in order to 
ensure a non-inflationary recovery. Generally speaking, the lower the reversibility of the non-
conventional operations, the larger the risk of “being behind the curve” when the 
macroeconomic and financial market situation improves.  
Indeed, to a large extent the speed of unwinding of unconventional measures would depend on 
their degree of reversibility. As already noted, some of the unwinding would happen 
automatically as central bank programmes become increasingly unattractive as financial 
conditions normalise. For instance, many lending facilities provide liquidity at a premium over 
the main policy rate or with a high haircut applied to the required collateral, making interbank 
lending the more attractive option once normal lending activity among market participants is 
restored. As a result, the central bank’s balance sheet would decline automatically as demand for 
its funds decreases (Bini Smaghi 2009).  
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as banks would automatically seek less credit from the ECB when tensions in financial markets 
ease. The speed of the reversibility would therefore largely depend on the speed of the 
resurgence of the financial system. In the euro area, the revitalisation of money markets is key to 
the ECB’s exit strategy and any future interest rate decision should therefore avoid a further 
disruption of money markets. In this context, bringing the main policy rate too close to zero 
would risk hampering the functioning of the money markets as it would reduce the incentives 
for interbank lending. This, in turn, could blur the important signals coming otherwise from the 
resurgence of interbank lending and the associated positive effect on the ECB’s balance sheet 
(Bini Smaghi 2009).  
Obviously, the speed of tightening would also depend on the maturity of the assets bought by 
central banks within the framework of their easing programmes (see section 1.5). Differences in 
the maturity of assets will ensure that a tightening of the accommodative stance would come in 
gradual tranches. This is important to avoid any abrupt tightening of credit conditions in the 
middle of the recovery. At the same time, measures centered on assets that are longer-term in 
nature and less liquid could pose challenges to the future unwinding of these measures (see 
section 1.5). If market conditions were to improve faster than expected, an increase in the 
average maturity of the central bank’s portfolio would make it more difficult for financial 
markets to return to normal private sector functioning and would also heighten medium-term 
inflation risks (Bini Smaghi 2009).  
Regardless of the specific modalities adopted for the exit strategy, key principles of “how” to 
phase out existing measures should in any case be timeliness and gradualism. Indeed, the stance 
of monetary policy should be normalised and the non-standard measures withdrawn in parallel 
with the gradual improvement in economic and financial conditions (González-Páramo 2009).  
Right now the scarcest resource we have is confidence in the future. That is why in the present, 
very demanding, circumstances all necessary steps should be taken to strengthen confidence at 
all levels. This calls for bold yet solidly anchored responses. We must maintain the appropriate 
balance between the need to take immediate action commensurate with the gravity of today’s 
situation, and the equally undeniable obligation to return to a path that is sound and sustainable 
in the medium and long term (Trichet 2009). 
 
When? Exiting too early vs. too late 
It has to be warned against a common and unfortunate view suggesting that it is currently too 
early, or even totally inopportune, to envisage appropriate exit strategies. Such a view is plain 
wrong because nobody should confuse the existence of a credible exit strategy – which can be 
activated at the right moment – with the decision to actually embark on that strategy. In terms of 
political economy, such kind of confusion often explains people’s fierce opposition to the mere 
existence of exit strategies. Moreover, the very existence and the visibility of a credible exit 
strategy will foster confidence today and will therefore contribute to the re-activation of the 
economy here and now (González-Páramo 2009, Trichet 2009).   
In discussing when to exit non-conventional monetary policy, we may distinguish here between 
the traditional interest rate instrument and the multiple non-standard liquidity measures. For the 
stance of monetary policy, the answer to this question is simple – at least in theory. Given the 
institutional policy of the ECB, the obvious point in time to tighten the policy stance is when, 
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based on the analysis of the outlook for economic activity and inflation, there is evidence of 
emerging upside risks to price stability. At that stage, the interest rate should be increased at the 
pace necessary to ensure price stability in the medium term. However, identifying the right 
moment in time to start a tightening phase is difficult already under normal conditions and even 
more so when the assessment of risks is, as in the current environment, surrounded by 
heightened uncertainty (González-Páramo 2009). 
Besides being technically difficult, identifying the exact moment when the balance of 
inflationary risks shifts could be complicated by the “noise” introduced by public utterances and 
pressures aimed at influencing the decision of the central bank. In section 1.1 I already 
mentioned the difficult environment the ECB faced in 2005 when, after leaving the central 
policy rate unchanged at 2% for two and a half years, it decided to start tightening the policy 
stance. With hindsight, the ECB’s decision served to anchor long-term inflation expectations. 
A past record of getting turning-points right is, however, no guarantee of success in the present 
context. Exceptionally high uncertainty implies that the exit from the current non-conventional 
monetary policy measures will need to be based on the analysis of a broader set of indicators 
than usual. Nevertheless, no matter how large the number and variety of indicators, one cannot 
exclude the risk of exiting from the non-conventional measures too soon or too late. Both 
situations would prove to be quite dangerous (González-Páramo 2009).  
 
Risk of exiting too early 
If a central bank starts exiting prematurely, it will be hard for it to reverse its course, should a 
deterioration in economic conditions materialise again. Indeed, historical experience shows that 
there is a certain element of irreversibility in the removal of non-conventional measures. This is 
because the effectiveness of non-conventional policy depends to a large extent on how long the 
policy is expected to stay in place. For instance, if an exceptional measure to increase liquidity 
supply to the banking sector is expected to be short-lived, banks are unlikely to extend 
additional credit to the private sector (González-Páramo 2009).  
More generally, even the appearance of a lack of commitment to its non-conventional measures 
(or simply of being uncomfortable with them) can prove self-defeating. It has been argued that, 
despite the announcement that the zero interest rate policy introduced in 1999 would be 
maintained until deflation was over, signs that the Bank of Japan was uncomfortable with this 
policy (culminating in a 25 basis point increase in the call rate in August 2000) prolonged the 
Japanese deflation unnecessarily (Eggertsson and Woodford 2003).  
At the same time, and here is the tricky issue, if the commitment is to be credible, it must also 
be realistic. Indeed, unless severe deflationary pressures become deeply entrenched in 
expectations, the public may not believe that public authorities are seriously committed to 
pursuing non-conventional measures when these measures are of such a large magnitude as to 
appear untenable for the balance sheet of the central bank or for the sustainability of public 
finances (González-Páramo 2009).  
 
Risk of exiting too late 
Exiting too late is dangerous because the public may lose faith in the central bank’s commitment 
to low inflation. We know – from our own historical experience in the 1970s and early 1980s – 
that, once public sector inflation expectations have become destabilised, it is extremely difficult 
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different issues of our ECB Observer, http://www.ecb-observer.com). By contrast, a credible 
commitment to an explicit inflation objective helps to anchor inflation expectations to the 
desired level of inflation, and this anchoring contributes in itself to delivering price stability. It 
is clear, then, that, as long as they remain well-anchored at the desired level, expectations can 
greatly facilitate the task of a central banker (González-Páramo 2009). 
A recent survey among market participants shows that only a small minority of respondents 
(less than 20%) are at present concerned about the implications of excess liquidity for future 
inflation in the euro area. This, together with the fact that long-term inflation expectations 
remain well-anchored at levels consistent with price stability, suggests that market participants 
are confident in the ability of the ECB to withdraw its non-conventional measures at the right 
point in time and at the appropriate pace (González-Páramo 2009). 
When assessing whether or not the non-conventional liquidity measures have achieved their 
objectives, one should be aware that such measures have been introduced for systemic purposes 
and not to address problems at individual institutions, which fall within the sphere of 
competence of national governments. Therefore, concerns about the costs or difficulties faced 
by individual institutions, once the exceptional provision of liquidity is discontinued, should not 




2.4  What exit strategies for public interventions in banks can be envisaged? 
How can competition be ensured? 
In general, it would be unwise to undertake the necessary monetary policy (and fiscal) exit 
without first addressing the remaining problems of the financial sector (von Hagen, Pisani-Ferry 
and von Weizsäcker 2009). Governments planning to withdraw financial-market support should 
first exit programs that guarantee bank liabilities and coordinate their moves with other 
countries to keep a level playing field. Bank-debt guarantees are potentially costly for public 
finances as governments assume credit risk. Governments may need to hold assets bought to 
help banks improve their balance sheets for some time, as their goal should be to generate the 
highest possible return. Once financial stability has been established, priority should be given to 
exiting from those that have a significant distortionary impact on financial markets or involve 
considerable contingent liabilities for the government. Based on these criteria, it would be 
reasonable to unwind government guarantee on bank debt earlier than disposing of impaired 
assets acquired by the public sector (IMF 2009). 
In answering the above questions, I think it is advisable to strictly follow a persuasive proposal 
developed by Snower (2008), according to which the main problem in the financial sector is the 
potential insolvency of systemically relevant financial institutions has become the main 
challenge. Just as central banks act as “lender of last resort” in the case of illiquidity, 
governments should act as “buyer of last resort” in the case of insolvency, when there are no 
willing private buyers. In turn, bailed-out institutions need to accept tighter regulation and 
supervision.   
Having purchased shares in troubled financial institutions, governments need to specify how 
they intend to return this equity to the private sector. This is important, because governments are 
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generally less capable of running banks than bankers are, particularly once appropriate 
regulation is in place. Financial markets are likely to suffer if the part-nationalization of banks is 
open-ended. 
Once the rescued financial institution regains strength to operate on its own, one possible exit 
strategy for the government is to hand over the acquired equity to a trust company. The trust 
company has the task of selling the shares within a given period (e.g., ten years) with the sole 
objective of maximizing the profit and, thereby, minimizing the taxpayers’ burden.  Thus far, 
this has not happened. Bondholders and shareholders of the bailed-out financial institutions or 
companies need to share the losses as well. Whereas the shareholders contribute automatically 
by putting up with the dilution of their equity, bondholders could take part in the burden sharing 
by compulsively accepting a debt-to-equity swap, where their bonds are converted into shares.   
In the long run, improvements in financial regulation will have to take the lessons from these 
new experiences into account. Since modern banks cross international boundaries, improved 
financial regulation will entail a number of things. First of all, international policymakers will 
have to coordinate ways in which to let banks fail without taking economies down with them, in 
a manner similar to bankruptcy reorganization. This may require setting up an international 
deposit insurance fund for those banks which are large relative to their countries (such as those 
in Austria), modeled on the FDIC, or it may require breaking large banks into smaller pieces, 
each of which is not too big to fail.   
International regulators could also increase capital requirements (thus reducing the risk of future 
insolvency) once the economic situation has improved. They can increase transparency by 
moving derivatives trades such as that in CDSs onto a centralized exchange to be cleared, as is 
done for futures and options. At the local level, individual countries or states could increase the 
(so far lax) requirements on the origination of loans, particularly subprime residential 
mortgages. However, caution is also needed when it comes to political decision making. 
Policymakers need to be careful to focus on creditworthiness in deciding on public loan 
allocations or new regulations, not on benefits to specific political constituencies (Snower 
2008). 
While I am very much in favor of the Snower approach, one should not forget to mention a 
recent example of a more conventional and cautionary approach which is presented by Levy and 
Panetta (2009). The latter draws upon the fact that, in December 2009, government guarantees 
on the issuance of bank bonds will close to new issuance in many EU countries. The authors 
argue that the guarantees have been effective and should be extended into 2010, despite 
improved market conditions and bank profitability. But in doing so, governments should correct 
the schemes for some distortionary effects and develop a careful exit strategy. 
 
 
2.5  Are the options presented by Bini Smaghi viable and if yes, which 
option should be favoured? 
Bini Smaghi (2009) suggested that the fiscal authority could issue debt securities and deposit the 
proceeds with the central bank. This would effectively transfer the liquidity previously created 
from the private to the public sector (first option). The ECB could also issue such certificates 
(second option), with essentially the same effect, with the aim of adjusting the structural 
position of the Eurosystem vis-à-vis the financial sector so as to create (or enlarge) a liquidity 
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that Bini Smaghi came up with his proposal, significantly before González-Páramo, Stark and 
Trichet presented their first draft of the ECB’s potential monetary exit strategy. 
In principle, the option to absorb excess liquidity by issuing certificates is a suitable one. It 
enables to drain much liquidity within a quite short time. Principally, both approaches also 
augment the toolbox of the ECB and might be convenient to run a more restrictive monetary 
policy without necessarily increase interest rates such as the main refinancing rate. Using this 
option makes sense in situations in which there is the danger that the ECB falls behind the curve 
because share and commodity prices continue to increase substantially and/or inflation fears 
emerge. The alternative is a gradual maturing of the LTRO, as was indicated by Trichet at the 
press conference at the occasion of the most recent GC meeting in November 2009. Important 
details followed during the next press conferences in December 2009 and March 2010. 
 
Options 1 and 2: Asset side of the ECB’s balance sheet neglected? 
However, some critics claim that the problem inherent in both approaches is that they merely 
deal with a reorganisation of the structure of the liability side of the ECB’s balance sheet, 
according to the first option from bank deposits to government deposits. Hence, both approaches 
proposed by Bini Smaghi are arguably not well-suited to either diminish the bloated ECB 
balance sheet or to remove the (potentially) toxic assets from this balance sheet - given that the 
main aim is to lower the high excess reserves. The caveat relating to the toxic assets is raised 
with an eye on the fact that it is currently very attractive for commercial banks in some to off-
load their potentially toxic assets still included in their balance sheets at the central bank. The 
liquidity received in return is not used for the extension of credit to the private sector but to 
lower the risk weighted capital adequacy ratio. By this, the banks must provide less equity 
capital as without the generous liquidity provision. In addition, the intake of potentially toxic 
assets as collateral in the central bank balance sheet artificially keeps the asset prices up. To 
avoid such kind of problematic issues, any exit strategy should rather also consider how to deal 
with the asset side of the ECB’s balance sheet. However, a closer look at the ECB statute (Art. 
18) on open market and credit operations reveals that the above passages referring to toxic 
papers are valid with respect to the Fed but (due to the specific accounting principles of repo 
operations in the euro area) not for the ECB, notwithstanding the validity of the remaining parts 
of the above assessment (ECB 2008).  
It is also not overall true in this context that – as nevertheless sometimes claimed by critics - in 
both cases some administrative obstacles would have to be passed. For instance, it is sometimes 
argued that (with reference to option 2) the ECB cannot simply decide to issue own certificates 
but probably would have to obtain the (implicit) approval and support of the governments in 
doing so. But the national governments do not have an interest in the central bank to get in their 
way as a competitor on the bond market. Whereas involvement of the fiscal authorities is 
obviously necessary in case of option 1, this argument is not wholly true in the case of option 2 
since the issuance of debt certificates by the ECB takes place within the framework of open 
market operations which can be conducted by the ECB in an arbitrary fashion. The respective 
papers have a duration of less than twelve months and are only offered to banks. Unfettered 
competition of ECB debt papers with government bonds should thus be limited. However, 
indirect effects cannot be excluded in both cases (options 1 and 2) since many commercial 
banks up to now satisfy their liquidity needs on the money market due to the steep yield curve, 
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and park it in longer-run government bonds. As soon as the ECB will absorb liquidity, some 
countries will experience trouble and the spreads will enlarge again. However, the money 
market rate is not necessarily affected as long as the liquidity buffer in the system keeps large 
enough. 
Overall, the caveat that the Bini Smaghi proposals neglect the asset side of the ECB’s balance 
sheet is not completely corroborated. Let us now turn to a potentially more relevant caveat. 
 
Options 1 and 2: Simply not necessary? 
Both options deal with skimming the additional liquidity which was made available by the more 
recent unorthodox policies. The latter comprise, above all, the unlimited allotment within the 
MROs and the LTROs and the buying-up of covered bonds. What are the orders of magnitude 
involved, according to the ECB publications such as, for instance, the November 2009 ECB 
Monthly Report? Currently, the private sector’s need of central bank money (autonomous 
factors plus minimum reserve) amounts to about 600 bn €. The ECB provides about 650 bn via 
credit (52 bn MRO and 595 bn LTRO, of which 517 bn have a duration of one year and 445 bn 
will become due in June 2010) and via purchase of covered bonds (23 bn).  
In other words, the ECB has provided liquidity in the framework of the unorthodox policies in 
the first instance above all by the so-called indirect or endogenous quantitative/credit easing (see 
also section 4.3 in Bini Smaghi 2009). This implies that the largest part of additional liquidity is 
automatically reduced and repatriated, i.e. when credits become due. The issuance of debt 
certificates is practically not required, neither by governments nor by the ECB, in order to 
absorb liquidity, unless: 
-  the covered bond programme has a quite large volume, and/or 
-  the absorption of liquidity must take place before the maturity of the long-term credit 
and it is not possible to allot less liquidity within the weekly MROs. 
 
Seen on the whole, thus, the instruments proposed by Bini Smaghi are currently probably not 
needed in the euro area. This assessment might be valid until June 2010 except if a large volume 
has to be mopped up before this date and liquidity skimming is not possible by means of 
rationing MROs (note again that Bini Smaghi has delivered his speech before the public was 
informed about any potential details of the envisaged exit from UMP measures). However, if the 
ECB’s covered bond programme would have embraced a larger volume and less liquidity would 
have been provided via credit (the latter implying that liquidity would have been reduced 
automatically), the instruments proposed by Bini Smaghi would have certainly been more 
interesting in the current context. 
Mopping up liquidity will become necessary if there is no need of liquidity any more, i.e. as 
soon as the interbank markets will function again and the ECB will not have to act as an 
intermediary. If this is the case until June 2010 and the skimming of liquidity via less credit 
(rationing in the area of the MROs) is not possible but the „structural“ excess banks have 
nevertheless to be skimmed, I do not see a persuasive advantage of issuing debt as compared to 
deposit facilities. In the same vein, it does not appear to be overall consistent that the ECB once 
again enacted a LTRO with a duration of one year in September 2009 and considers to do the 
same again probably in December. By this, the ECB deprives itself of much of its flexibility to 
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Against the background of how the ECB has provided the additional liquidity up to now the 
augmentation of the ECB’s toolkit box as proposed by Bini Smaghi is not necessary, since the 
previous instruments proved to be sufficient (up to now) and enable the ECB to flexibly 
providing credits via MROs (but certainly not more LTROs which were actually not prolonged 
by the ECB). As long as interbank markets do not function well, the ECB can use deposit 
facilities. 
 
First option: pros and cons 
The first option reminds one of the German „Stabilitätsgesetz“ as of 1967. The latter provided 
the fiscal authority to park financial means at the Bundesbank in order to avoid an overheating 
of the economy. If this option is seized, this could be interpreted as a signal into the direction of 
a stronger cooperation of monetary and fiscal policy – implying the danger of blurring 
competencies. The engagement of fiscal authorities in this context could also undermine the 
independence of the ECB (Belke and Potrafke 2009 and the literature cited therein; for an 
opposite view, see Buiter 2009a). 
 
Second option: pros and cons 
The second option circumvents the issues of a (too) close interdependency between the 
independent ECB and the fiscal authorities. However, it could be problematic that the ECB 
engages itself at the markets to an even larger extent than already up to now by issuing and 
selling own debt certificates – and also across a longer time span, depending on the maturity of 
the certificates. Moreover, it has to be taken into account that the ECB has already bought 
covered bonds. If the ECB sells other assets only a bit later, this might convey the impression of 
monetary policy activism.  
The second option is to drain liquidity by issuing so-called ECB debt certificates.  By issuing 
such certificates, which can have a maturity of up to one year, the ECB would enter new 
territory. Issuing ECB debt certificates would probably be best suited to a situation where some 
monetary financial institutions have a structural liquidity overhang that they are reluctant to 
offer in the interbank market. It is difficult to assess from the publicly available data whether the 
deposit facility is repeatedly used by the same institutions or whether there is rotation in the 
banks that are depositing their excess funds with the ECB overnight. The ECB has the 
underlying micro data and, hence, should be able to judge whether the excess reserves are 
structurally tied to the same “problematic” institutions. However, when adding or absorbing 
excess liquidity the ECB is – independent of the chosen procedure – not capable of 
discriminating between a „crisis bank“ and healthy institutions. This might pose a fundamental 
problem, since obviously many healthy banks have used excess liquidity for carry trade 
strategies at the bond markets and carousel frauds. 
 
Which option should be favoured? 
If any, one should prefer option 2 because the potential loss of the ECB independence weighs 
too heavily. This option has been enacted quite successfully in Germany already in times of the 
Bundesbank (until the early 90s, see Deutsche Bundesbank 1997). A similar instrument is also 
contained in the toolbox of the Bank of Japan but not used frequently in the past. However, note 
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that the US Fed would require Congressional authorization in this case. Also the SNB has issued 
its own interest bearing debt certificates, “to be more flexible in steering liquidity”. Some 
analysts argued at the beginning of December 2009 that there was a good chance that the ECB 
will “go Swiss” once more. But the ECB did not fulfill their expectations! The first auction of 
SNB US dollar-denominated bills, i.e. short-term debt with terms of less than one year, took 
place on February 16, 2009, via the Eurex Zurich electronic trading platform, with 28, 84 and 
168-day bills on offer. The bills were also be eligible as collateral for SNB repos. The Swiss 
National Bank (SNB) said it would issue this short-term debt in US dollars in order to finance a 
billion-dollar loan made to Switzerland's biggest bank UBS to help it isolate its illiquid assets. 
Other auctions were said to follow fortnightly 'until further notice'. 
Under option 2, one could also address non-banks – a possibility which is not covered by the 
ECB statute up to now but would enhance the flexibility of this instrument as compared to 
option 1. However, using this instrument could become quite costly, since one has to offer the 
banks incentives to sterilize their liquidity. But this can also not be avoided by alternative 
measures such as re-selling the covered bonds. In the end, option 2 appears also more realistic 
since it is not at all clear how it can be made sure that the governments effectively leave the 
proceeds with the ECB and do not consume it as in the case of the SNB described above. 
Moreover, option 1 would challenge ECB independence to a larger extent. The practical 
implementation problems should thus also be larger in this case.  
 
3.  COORDINATION OF EXIT STRATEGIES 
It is not self-evident that the phase-out should be coordinated, as the current economic situation 
differs in the different OECD countries. However, the argument that the exit strategies for the 
phase out of the support to the banking sector should be coordinated is on much safer grounds. 
Otherwise there is a risk that competition could be distorted if some countries retain their fiscal 
policy stimulus measures while others phase them out. For example, banks will be subsidised to 
some extent in those countries where bank support programmes are retained in contrast to 
countries where such programmes are phased out (see section 1.4).  
Hence, the issue of the timing and the coordination of the monetary exit strategies on the global 
level but also as regards the interaction between monetary and fiscal exits should be carefully 
assessed. For instance, de Grauwe (2009) underlines that there can be little doubt that the spill-
over effects on monetary policies are large. The degree of financial integration is such that 
actions by the major central banks are felt everywhere, which is shown by the success of high 
cooperation between central banks during the crisis. Is there a case to be made for (globally) 
coordinating monetary exit strategies? Should there be coordination between the monetary and 
fiscal exit strategies?  
 
 
3.1  (Global) Coordination of monetary exit strategies  
The standard argument in favour of coordination of the monetary policies designed for exit runs 
as follows. On the monetary side, economies that tighten first may find their currencies 
appreciating and, in so doing, draw capital away from countries not yet strongly recovering. In 
turn, that may induce currency interventions to offset the spillovers, which could contribute to 
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anchored inflation expectations have enabled aggressive policy easing and helped stave off 
deflation - yet they are well anchored in part because every major country is aboard; any 
significant divergences in inflation goals would erode that to everyone's detriment. But the way 
back from expansionary fiscal policies will be infinitely slower – not a matter of weeks, as it 
was in 2008 when the stimulus programmes were being put in place, but a matter of years. 
When the horizon lengthens, spillovers among countries become less important. Hence, fiscal 
policy in turn has the smallest international spillovers, and should receive the least attention 
(Giavazzi 2009, Posen 2009).  
 
Global liquidity, uncertainty and the coordination of exit strategies 
In order to assess the deeper relevance of this argument it makes sense to have a closer look at 
studies on global liquidity. For instance, Belke and Rees (2009) analyze the importance of 
global shocks for the global economy and national policy makers. More specifically, they 
investigate whether monetary policy has become less effective in the wake of financial 
globalization. They also examine whether there is increasing uncertainty for central banks due to 
globalization-driven changes in the national economic structure. A FAVAR framework is 
applied to derive structural shocks on a worldwide level and their impact on other global and 
also national variables. The authors estimate their macro model using quarterly data from Q1 
1984 to Q4 2007 for the G7 countries plus the euro area. According to their results, global 
liquidity shocks are a driving force of the global economy and various national economies. 
However, some other shocks originating from house prices, GDP, technology and long-term 
interest rates play a role at the global level as well. These results prove to be robust across 
different specifications. Structural break tests indicate that global liquidity shocks have recently 
become more important as a determinant for house prices. In general, global variables have 
become more powerful over time in driving national variables. 
More important in our context, Belke and Rees (2009) have investigated whether there is 
increasing uncertainty for monetary policy in the wake of globalization and whether central 
banks have become less effective in influencing national liquidity conditions. In brief, our 
answer to both questions is a clear “yes”. First, global liquidity conveys additional information 
about monetary conditions not summarized by national money and short-term interest rates. 
Second, global liquidity restricts national monetary policy in its ability to influence nominal and 
real variables, caused by, for example, the effect of global liquidity on short-term interest rates. 
As a consequence, the influence of central banks on domestic money supply is weakening. 
Third, national monetary policy is faced with an increasing degree of uncertainty and might feel 
forced to act according to the so-called Brainard conservatism principle (Brainard 1967). Fourth, 
the old question of optimal monetary policy among interdependent economies powerfully 
reappears on the surface. In the following, we elaborate a bit more on the third and the fourth 
policy conclusion. 
Our third policy conclusion is that national monetary policy is faced with an increasing degree 
of uncertainty. Needless to say, monetary policy always operates in an environment of 
uncertainty. Sometimes, for instance, it is not unambiguously clear for central banks how to 
interpret new incoming macroeconomic data (as is now the case with respect to the 
sustainability of the worldwide recovery). Moreover, there are uncertainties about the concise 
monetary transmission mechanism. However, our empirical results indicate that the fog of 
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uncertainty has indeed increasingly become denser due to structural changes in the transmission 
process between global and national variables. Among other common forces, this seems to be 
also true for global liquidity, which has an increasingly stronger effect on monetary aggregates 
in some but not all countries. This “Knightian uncertainty” or model uncertainty may have 
significant implications for the behavior of central banks. Posen (2009) puts it like this: ”The 
unconventional monetary policy measures have indeed served the pursuit of price stability as 
intended, although with more uncertainty about their size of impact than central banks would 
prefer”. 
According to the Brainard conservatism principle, uncertainties about major model parameters 
can change the incentives facing central bankers, thereby leading them to use their policy 
instruments less vigorously. The reason is that uncertainties about the elasticity between global 
and national money are amplified in the economy the more monetary policy reacts to this 
relation. Since the Brainard conservatism introduces a motive for caution in optimal central 
bank behavior, financial globalization and its corresponding structural changes may be 
important reasons for central banks not fighting against strong rises in monetary and credit 
aggregates in the last few years.  
Our fourth policy conclusion concerns the question of the optimal design of monetary policy 
among interdependent economies. Should open “spillover-driven” economies adopt rules 
designed to fit specific features of more open and more closed economies? This is old wine in 
new bottles and is closely related to the popular debates about inward-looking versus outward-
looking monetary policy and commitment versus discretion, respectively.  
The Chicago School saw a flexible exchange rate as a way of insulating domestic developments 
from foreign economic disturbances, including foreign monetary policy. There is no need, they 
argued, for central banks to coordinate their monetary policies. All that is needed is flexible 
exchange rates. Does the existence of global liquidity mean that we need coordination or even a 
world central bank? International coordination might be needed to keep global liquidity shocks 
as low as possible, since structural changes between global and national liquidity cannot be 
influenced by central banks. One reason is that monetary competition between central banks 
might cause a free-rider problem in the absence of any coordination. If a national central bank, 
let’s say the Fed, is inclined to conduct a lax monetary policy, liquidity spillovers occur and 
foreign central banks have to bear parts of the burden. Another reason is that there may be 
multiplier effects that occur when several countries all turn their monetary policy in the same 
direction.  
The crucial issue is not only how to deliver a coordinated exit from unorthodox expansionary 
monetary policies but even more so how best to prevent further excessive, synchronized shifts in 
the world money stock. Policy coordination in this context would eventually bring greater 
predictability, but at the risk of all countries simultaneously choosing the wrong set of policies. 
International policy coordination would merely elevate to the global level the shortcomings that 
are now apparent at the domestic level. This is especially valid in times of high uncertainty 
about whether and when the world economy has substantially recovered from the crisis in which 
it might generally be better to have independent national monetary policies that are not 
coordinated (or at least not correlated) worldwide, because this leads to risk diversification: the 
variance of a sum of shocks is lower the lower the covariance among the individual components 
(Belke and Gros 2009, with an application to fiscal policy).  
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Coordinating exit with asymmetric country interests – The ECB should go ahead 
Note that the US should be part of any meaningful coordination of monetary exit, especially 
with an eye on its large share at vagabonding global liquidity having its origin to large parts in 
US monetary policy in strong implicit – though not always explicit - alliance with dollar-pegged 
China. Otherwise, worldwide coordination would be out of the reach because the euro area with 
its medium-term target of price stability and some Asian regions with a new bubble emanating 
both have a stake in starting monetary exit in the not too far away future and would permanently 
become the receiving country of carry trades. The latter would undermine the effectiveness of 
their efforts to exit and would eventually force them to impose capital controls. 
However, up to now the Fed did not announce any concrete steps with respect to its exit from 
UMP. So how does the relevant exit coordination game look like? Since European inflation 
expectations remain firmly anchored, while US inflation expectations are not, serious 
disturbances in international capital flows will be quite likely if the ECB credibly announces and 
starts with its exit unilaterally. Global investors will be in a position to switch out of dollar into 
euro assets, driving the dollar-euro bilateral exchange rate to unseen highs. It is not the time to 
give a prediction of the appreciation potential of the euro here. But one would reckon it is 
sizeable once the solvency crisis within the euro area will be overcome. The reason is that the 
US fiscal position and the Fed which is – according to Roubinis RGE Monitor nearly bankrupt 
by now deserves much more skepticism than that of the PIGS countries in the medium to long 
run- as measured by nearly all indicators (Munchau 2009). The crisis in the US bond markets 
would produce further financial strains. Germany’s current account surpluses, which we have 
worried about for years, will miraculous disappear, and may even turn into a deficit. The US 
would run a massive trade surplus. The days of the dollar as the global reserve currency of 
choice would be numbered, and the euro will, at least temporarily, take over (Belke 2009a, 
Belke, Goecke and Guenther 2009).  
In the same vein, China’s chief banking regulator has recently said that the US Federal 
Reserve’s weak monetary policy is fueling speculative investments in stock and property 
markets and endangering the global economic recovery (FT 2009). Mingkang believes the 
combination of a weak dollar and the Fed’s low interest rates are facilitating a “huge carry 
trade” that is distorting global asset prices. China which is the largest US creditor by virtue of its 
massive Treasury bond holdings has previously focused its criticism also on US fiscal policy, 
arguing that Washington’s rising debt burden is undermining the dollar. Liu’s remarks come at 
time when China’s own monetary policy is also attracting scrutiny, following the massive credit 
expansion seen so far this year. Qin Xiao, chairman of China Merchants Bank, said last week 
that Beijing urgently needed to tighten monetary policy to avoid stock and property market 
bubbles. 
However, there may be some other more reliable allies for the ECB in Far East because nothing 
prevents emerging Asia’s central banks from acting and to exit from very expansionary 
monetary policies. US monetary conditions are clearly not appropriate to their circumstances. 
Their economies are growing robustly. They are the ones with bubble trouble. They can and 
should tighten now. Yes, doing so will create problems. In particular, tightening while the Fed 
remains on hold will mean that emerging Asian currencies will appreciate against the dollar. 
This will be uncomfortable for a set of economies accustomed to export-led growth and to the 
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security of dollar pegs. But if the price of those dollar pegs is an asset bubble that sets the stage 
for a disruptive crash – one that does serious damage to banks and corporations with significant 
exposures to the property market – then that price is no longer worth paying (Eichengreen 
2009). The danger posed by Asia’s financial bubbles is real. But it is important to take the right 
steps to combat it. This is appropriately a task for emerging market central banks, but via the 
global liquidity link and carry trades also for the Fed and the ECB.  
Moreover, increased financial integration diminishes the gains from policy coordination. 
Economic conditions overseas become more important for governments. This should dampen 
their incentives to enact beggar-thy-neighbor policies even when they abstain from coordination 
(Belke et al. 2002). Hence, it would currently be clearly desirable if, this time, a clear price 
stability orientation of the ECB would also induce the Fed to enact a timely exit from its 
strongly expansionary macro policies (for instance, because the US are not willing to give up the 
status of the dollar as a world reserve currency faced with increasing mistrust of Russia and 
other countries in the dollar). Such kind of a monetary policy somersault would take significant 
pressure from European exports and wages since the very low US money market rates are 
generally considered as the main reason for the decline of the dollar. This would correspond 
with a return of the world to more monetary stability and growth, while preserving the status 
quo regarding the world reserve currency. Anyway and also with an eye on the huge amounts of 
liquidity vagabonding around the globe, a coordination of the exit and not of a non-exit from 
UMP on both sides of the Atlantic is highly indicated. The alternative would be that the doubts 
about the stability of the dollar would increase even more (Belke 2009a).  
 
 
3.2  Coordination between the monetary and fiscal exit 
 strategies? 
It should be clearly acknowledged that a necessary condition for central banks to be able to do 
their job of delivering price stability is the sustainability and credibility of public finances. 
According to the institutional set-up of European Monetary Union, this requires full (though not 
at all realistic, since sanctions are not credible) compliance by national governments with the 
rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, a fundamental component of the policy framework for 
area-wide macroeconomic stability (González-Páramo 2009). 
The fiscal costs of the crisis – stemming from discretionary stimulus measures, the use of 
automatic stabilisers and measures in support of the financial sector – are likely to be 
considerable. These costs, together with the expected adverse fiscal impact of population 
ageing, pose considerable risks to future fiscal sustainability. In the aftermath of the crisis, many 
countries may not be able to rely on sustained GDP growth to smoothly reduce their debt 
burdens. This means that ambitious plans for structural fiscal consolidation need to be 
developed and communicated in order to guarantee the public’s trust in the sustainability of 
public finances. Together with the direct impact of monetary exit strategies via the yield curve 
on public debt consolidation and other feedback mechanisms this appears to underline the need 
of coordination of monetary and fiscal exit.  
The issue then is one of sequencing. Should central banks start thinking about rescinding their 
exceptional monetary accommodation, or should governments start cutting deficits (Giavazzi 
2009)? Taking into account various fiscal theories of the price level and inflation, the ECB was 
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monetary accommodation. The more delayed the fiscal exit, ceteris paribus, the more 
trenchingly the monetary policy exit might have to be brought forward. Indeed, given the level 
of the debt accumulated in most advanced economies, any delay in the fiscal exit is likely to 
have an effect on inflation expectations, and may even disanchor them. This is a risk that the 
ECB’s monetary policy cannot take, as it would undermine its overall strategy. In other words, 
fiscal responsibility on behalf of Eurozone governments would help avoid a premature exit from 
unconventional measures by the ECB.  
 
The valuable option to delay exit 
Both governments and central banks have good arguments for a delay of exit. The balance 
sheets of financial institutions are far from being fully repaired and some argue that this should 
be done first before any fiscal or even monetary exit is envisaged (Giavazzi 2009, von Hagen, 
Pisani-Ferry and von Weizsäcker 2009). Moreover, banks, flush with cash but still unwilling to 
lend, are taking advantage of the yield curve to borrow short and lend long, especially to 
governments. An abrupt increase in long-term rates risks turning these carry trades sour (see 
section 1.5). On the other front, we don’t know to what extent the recovery that seems to have 
started is simply the result of the stimulus programmes starting to kick in (Belke 2009). 
Anyway, a couple of fiscal multiplier analyses tell us that the effects are smaller than and in 
parts pro-cyclical. This makes governments understandably reluctant to cut spending or raise 
taxes. This “option value of waiting” might even apply to monetary policy. 
The Giavazzi chicken game 
In the classic game of chicken, one possibility is that neither player yields to the other, resulting 
in the worst outcome for both. In the case at hand, this would entail an increase in long-term 
interest rates resulting from a combination of fear of persistent deficits creating large debts, fear 
of inflation from persistent monetary accommodation, or simply from the anticipation that 
central banks will move first and rather early (Giavazzi 2009). This is a sure way to kill the by 
now rather fragile recovery. Is there any way out? 
The answer usually is an irrevocable commitment by governments to cut spending in the future. 
Such an ideal case commitment would stabilise expectations and allow central banks to wait 
longer before they remove their monetary accommodation. At the same time, it would avoid the 
demand risks that an immediate removal of the fiscal stimulus would impose. Although such 
commitment may be difficult to achieve, there are arguably means of making spending reversals 
credible  ex ante (see the German “Schuldenbremse” which was written even into the 
constitution). 
Thus monetary and fiscal authorities face the choice from where to start. Should monetary 
accommodation be removed first, or should we start from fiscal policy? Absent a credible fiscal 
exit strategy, long rates could soon increase as financial markets start anticipating the response 
of central banks to the lack of action on the fiscal front. The increase in long rates would depress 
consumption and investment and prevent internal rebalancing. A clear commitment to future 
spending cuts is a smart way to allow central banks to maintain an accommodative policy for 
some more time (Giavazzi 2009). 
But by their nature and proven by the current experience, fiscal policies lack a similarly strong 
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built-in mechanism when it comes to the unwinding of stimulus (Belke 2009). Hence, 
discretionary policies need to be invoked to engineer an exit from the current degree of fiscal 
expansion. A return to sound, sustainable public finances, thus strengthening overall 
macroeconomic stability, must be ensured. Euro area governments should prepare and 
communicate ambitious and realistic fiscal exit and consolidation strategies within the 
framework of the Stability and Growth Pact (Trichet 2009). 
 
On the theoretical benefits of coordination among monetary and fiscal policy 
It is important that there is much scope for beneficial coordination of monetary policy with 
fiscal policy. For one thing, any increase in interest rates means a higher debt servicing burden 
for the fiscal authorities (Tesfaselassie 2009). From a fiscal policy point of view, it should be 
noted that although the exit from monetary measures will be uniform across the euro area, it is 
likely to have asymmetric fiscal impacts given the current substantial heterogeneity of fiscal 
positions. A potential increase in market interest rates will have a much stronger impact on 
highly indebted countries, in particular those with outstanding government bonds with short 
maturities (Stark 2009). The need for fiscal flexibility under a single monetary policy places a 
clear premium on timely and credible fiscal consolidation in all euro area member countries, and 
the workings of this mechanism should not be undermined.  
Likewise, if central banks for instance would start raising the interest rates they pay on banks’ 
reserves, then reserves will compete with government bonds as investment vehicles. This could 
drive up government borrowing costs and create tensions with fiscal policy. A possible 
resolution is to have a clearly defined path for fiscal sustainability and let monetary policy focus 
on fighting inflationary pressures in the economy. This can happen with the full support of 
governments. They need to understand that the massive fiscal stimulus packages and private 
sector bailouts cannot continue indefinitely. Fiscal authorities should devise their own exit 
strategies in a way that contributes to the effectiveness of monetary policy in supporting 
sustainable growth and price stability (Tesfaselassie 2009). 
Taking these interactions as a starting point, for instance, von Hagen, Pisani-Ferry and 
Weizsäcker (2009) propose that an excellent ad-hoc reinforced consultation mechanism should 
be set up at European level for 2.5 years, renewable once in order to ensure the necessary 
coordination of the exit between member states and central banks. According to their concept, 
budgetary consolidation should come before monetary tightening, mainly because fiscal policy 
is the more costly and less nimble stimulus instrument. Besides, delaying consolidation or 
leaving its pace and duration hanging in the air would involve a non-trivial risk of adverse bond 
market reaction. 
Finally, successful budgetary consolidation will reduce inflationary pressures, thereby allowing 
central banks to sustain a supportive monetary policy stance for longer and tighten monetary 
policy only when inflationary potential arises. This sequencing, rather than monetary tightening 
first and budgetary consolidation second, should be a priority goal in the design of exit strategies 
(von Hagen, Pisani-Ferry and von Weizsäcker 2009).  
If budgetary policy is given precedence, the implication is that, consistent with central banks’ 
mandates, monetary policy should remain geared to price stability and would normalise once 
justified by expected price developments. In this process of normalisation, central banks should 
continue with their past attitude of focusing on second round effects of increases in world 
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economy starts to pick up again (von Hagen, Pisani-Ferry and von Weizsäcker 2009).  
 
Failure of implementing credible commitments of fiscal consolidation - Does waiting with 
monetary exit really make sense? 
However, studies with a global view on asset price developments clearly show that global 
excess liquidity impacts first on prices of raw materials and other commodities (Belke and Rees 
2009). Their results indicate throughout that commodity prices might well serve as indicators of 
future inflationary pressures on goods markets. Why then waiting for second round effects, 
faced with the ECB’s medium term strategy? What is more, if governments still diligently emit 
bonds and commercial banks off-load newly emitted bonds at the ECB for refinancing purposes 
(100 percent of the debt is refinanced with central bank money!), this further fuels global 
liquidity. A vicious circle would emerge without monetary policy exiting from expansionary 
policies. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that the substantial increases in public debt may give 
rise to pressures on the ECB to provide easier lending terms, which would nonetheless be self-
defeating and ultimately lead to inflation. Consequently, as economies recover from the crisis, it 
is essential that the capacity of central banks to control inflation will be fully preserved 
(Cottarelli and Viñals 2009). Hence, in the current scenario, we will almost certainly not be able 
to make the case that we will see fiscal policy exiting first because there is in theory no lack of a 
suitable credible commitment (such as increasing the retirement age) but de facto no credible 
commitment of fiscal policy in sight. 
The same critique principally applies to studies asking a couple of years ago what kind of 
additional co-operation (-ordination) was necessary and feasible to cope with the new 
institutional set-up under EMU. Starting from the episode of the repo rate cut by the ECB in 
early 1999, for instance, Belke (2002) asked what would have happened under a business as 
usual scenario. In this case, the pre-Maastricht pattern of fiscal policy would have quickly led to 
grave problems. A promising alternative monetary-fiscal policy mix in the first half of 1999 
consisted of a restrictive fiscal policy and a monetary policy which had - within the bounds of 
price stability - some leeway to act counter-cyclically. However, this also more or less boils 
down to a “if there really is a credible commitment of fiscal policy” strategy and in absence of 
any such commitment unfortunately is not more than a teethless tiger. 
Hence, one should feel legitimized to ask: what if fiscal policy cannot credible commit itself due 
to, for instance, political business cycle considerations? Should we wait with monetary exit in 
this case? Here, the clear answer is no. What is more, the institutional framework of the euro 
area leaves no room for any explicit coordination between the single monetary policy of the 
ECB and the national fiscal policies. The Treaty sets up a clear allocation of responsibilities 
between monetary policy and national fiscal policies, with a view to ensuring a smooth 
functioning of monetary union. The institutional framework grants to the Eurosystem full 
independence from political influence and interference and assigns to the ECB the primary 
objective of maintaining price stability. At the same time, fiscal authorities are responsible for 
safeguarding the sustainability of public finances (Belke and Potrafke 2009, Stark 2009). 
This does not at all mean that there should be no interactions. The ECB Governing Council has 
always been involved in a constructive and open exchange of information on the current 
economic situation and structural reforms with other bodies and institutions at the European 
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level. Moreover, the outlook for fiscal policy plays a key role in the ECB’s projections for 
economic activity and our assessment of risks to price stability. In the same way, because the 
ECB’s policy decisions must exclusively be based on its assessment of risks to price stability, its 
responses can be rather safely predicted by fiscal authorities (Belke et al. 2002). The channels 
for the exchange of information between fiscal and monetary authorities are also well 
developed. But there cannot and should not be any pre-commitment to a particular course of 
monetary policy action. This would undermine the ECB’s independence and therefore violate its 
mandate (Belke and Potrafke 2009, Belke et al. 2002). But there are additional problems which 
hamper an explicit coordination in the euro area. 
 
With whom to cooperate? 
A clear focus on preserving price stability becomes even more adequate if one takes into 
account that successful fiscal policy coordination as a conditio sine-qua-non for monetary-fiscal 
policy coordination is not at all realistic within the euro area. Seen on the whole, one is likely to 
find a consensus on the broad principle that a coordinated approach to fiscal exit strategies is 
desirable. It will, however, be difficult to implement this principle in practice (de Grauwe 2009). 
The reason is that different euro area countries face quite different economic conditions 
(“unanimity of fiscal policy interests”) and that there is no unified fiscal body (“economic 
government”) with which to coordinate macro policies, i.e. no single fiscal counterpart to back 
up the ECB.  
Generally, one should distinguish two types of countries today. The first group consists of the 
“Anglo-Saxon” countries (US, UK, Ireland and Spain) which have experienced strong growth 
over the decade preceding the crisis. The latter was based on a consumption and real estate 
boom made possible by unorthodox finance. Households and financial institutions in these 
countries have been supported by a massive increase of government debts and deficits and now 
have to unwind their unsustainable debt levels. In each of them, the government budget deficit 
takes values of more than 10% of GDP. A second group of countries did not experience the 
same kind of debt accumulation of households. It consists of mainly the continental European 
countries except Spain. In these countries, there is no need for households to reduce their debt 
levels. Only the financial institutions are faced by the problem or excessive debt accumulation. 
Consequently, their budget deficits are on average only half of the deficits prevailing in the first 
group of countries (de Grauwe 2009). 
The “Anglo-Saxon” countries are likely to hit the problem of unsustainable budget debts and 
deficits sooner than the continental European countries. They will be pressured to exit first, but 
they are also the countries that can least afford to do so – at least from a Keynesian point of 
view. An early fiscal policy exit strategy by these countries would – from a Keynesian 
perspective - set in motion any deflationary debt dynamics in a more intense way than in the 
continental European countries. These differences are likely to make a coordinated approach to 
fiscal exit strategies very difficult if not improbable (Frankel and Rockett 1988). 
Hence, unfortunately, the only realistic though only second best scenario in the euro area will be 
monetary tightening first and budgetary consolidation, if at all, second. Since macroeconomic 
uncertainty has fallen significantly since Lehman’s there is no large option value of waiting with 
a credible announcement of monetary exit any more (Belke 2009). 
 
  294.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Over the past years our economies have undergone a period of severe financial crisis and major 
disruptions to economic activity. While the full cost of the crisis has yet to be assessed, the 
magnitude of output and job losses experienced so far is considerable. In order to contain the 
impact of the crisis on the real economy and preserve price stability, central banks have 
aggressively cut policy interest rates and introduced a number of exceptional liquidity measures 
(González-Páramo 2009). 
Although the financial crisis is not yet over, one has to carefully and thoughtfully develop the 
strategy that will govern the progressive exit from the set of non-standard measures currently in 
place. This should not be seen as a none-too-subtle signalling device about imminent policy 
actions, but rather as a demonstration of the ECB’s commitment to engineering a smooth and 
orderly departure from the current extraordinary and unprecedented policy. Indeed, developing, 
communicating and eventually implementing in a timely manner a well-designed exit strategy is 
essential to preserve the contributions from the non-conventional policies to the maintenance of 
macroeconomic and financial stability (González-Páramo 2009).  
The exit from these exceptional monetary measures will require technical skill, especially in 
view of the well-known difficulties in bringing up the interbank rate exactly to a target rate such 
as the main refinancing rate. But the real challenge is the macroeconomic impact of such an exit 
which, if any, will be in a disinflationary direction by driving down asset prices and driving up 
interest rates as the economy recovers. The unconventional monetary policy measures have 
indeed served the pursuit of price stability as intended, although with more uncertainty about 
their size of impact than central banks would prefer (Posen 2009). 
What is more, expressed in terms of political economy, it would be a good idea to combine the 
exit strategies with structural reforms to boost the growth potential which has been severely 
damaged during the financial crisis (ECB Observer, various issues). In this case, economic 
growth will tend to be higher and resistance to monetary exit will be lower because in case of 
lower growth it is more difficult to persuade the electorate of the necessity of interest rate 
increases (although monetary exit will be more pressingly needed in this case to fight expected 
inflation).  
The general picture emerging from this report is one of serious flaws of our fiat money standard 
according to which governments still diligently emit bonds and commercial banks off-load 
newly emitted bonds at the ECB for refinancing purposes (100 percent of the debt is refinanced 
with central bank money!). Jointly with an increasing precautionary demand, this pattern 
explains the often mentioned liquidity "surplus". Frankly speaking and exaggerating only a little 
bit, the following view of UMP and the envisaged exit from it emerges: as soon as excess 
liquidity will be mopped up again on an international scale, the interest rate will increase. Some 
banks will then go bankrupt – anyway, they are like that already now, but then it becomes 
visible to everyone.  
Moreover, the sovereign debt scare in the euro area is not over for the same reason and the 
preceding argument might apply not only to banks but also to governments. Only recently, the 
spread between Greek and German bonds widened to 153 basis points at the beginning of 
December 2009 and increased to about 300 bp at the midst of March 2010 – a direct result of the 
country’s deteriorating finances. According to a Bloomberg story, the Greek central bank asked 
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domestic lenders to outline future funding sources after the ECB starts tightening liquidity 
provisions. The widening of the Greek bond was not mirror-imaged by a widening of CEE 
spreads which suggests that this is primarily a Greek problem, not a wider problem in the bond 
markets. A report by BNP Paribas says that 7% of excessive reserves are held by Greek banks, 
but when these reserves are drained, these banks will have to look for funding at market prices.  
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